Climate change in Europe

The vulnerability of several European regions to global environmental change will increase during coming decades, creating problems for agriculture, forestry, nature conservation, energy, water and tourism. This is a consequence of both climate change and changing land use. Together, these changes reduce the ability of ecosystems to deliver the 'services' human society needs, such as food, water and recreation. Particular at risk are the Mediterranean and mountain regions. These are the main conclusions of a new study, published in 'Science' this week.

Thus starts a press release by the authors of the Science study. The abstract of the original study is less gloomy:

To investigate ecosystem service supply during the 21st century, we used a range of ecosystem models and scenarios of climate and land-use change to conduct a Europe-wide assessment. Large changes in climate and land use typically resulted in large changes in ecosystem service supply. Some of these trends may be positive (for example, increases in forest area and productivity) or offer opportunities (for example, "surplus land" for agricultural extensification and bioenergy production). However, many changes increase vulnerability as a result of a decreasing supply of ecosystem services (for example, declining soil fertility, declining water availability, increasing risk of forest fires), especially in the Mediterranean and mountain regions.

The differences between the two accounts of the same study by the same authors are interesting in their own right, but I will not dwell on that.

According to the study, Mediterranean and mountain regions will experience more drastic changes in the geographic distribution of species. Given the limited ability of species to shift their ranges, partly due to the fact that agricultural lands and towns act as barriers to dispersal, many species will have reduced geographic ranges. As a result, the study cites "implications for the sense of place and cultural identity of the inhabitants, traditional forms of land use, and the tourism sector."

Additionally, mountain regions will have less snow cover:

Case studies for the Rhine, Rhône, and Danube basins, as well as for small Alpine catchments, indicated climate-induced changes in the timing of runoff. These result from impacts of rising temperatures on snow-cover dynamics, which enhanced winter runoff, reduced summer runoff, and shifted monthly peak flows by up to two months earlier than at present. This reduced water supply at peak demand times and increased the risk of winter floods. Changes in snow-cover dynamics directly affect biodiversity at high elevations. Moreover, navigation and hydropower potential would be altered.

In addition to its importance for water supply and biodiversity conservation, snow cover is of course indispensable for winter tourism. The Alpine case studies indicated a rise in the elevation of reliable snow cover from about 1300 m today to 1500 to 1750 m at the end of the 21st century. A 300-m rise of the snow line would reduce the proportion of Swiss ski areas with sufficient snow from currently about 85 to 63%. [I have deleted the references to tables and other studies.]

It seems to me that less snow cover would also have some benefits for the people who live in those places, but the authors do not mention them. Anyway, I think the enjoyment of higher temperatures across Europe more than offsets the predicament of skiers.

Regarding the Mediterranean, "[t]he impacts included water shortages, increased risk of forest fires, northward shifts in the distribution of typical tree species, and losses of agricultural potential." Problems of water shortages, forest fires and agriculture in Mediterranean Europe have mainly political, not environmental, causes. Water shortages are due to government subsidies to consumption, especially in agriculture. Humans intentionally cause almost all forest fires in the region. In Spain, the regions most affected by fires are those with the wettest climate. There (here, from my geographical point of view), unwanted fires result from a combination of bizarre government subsidies and loose property rights of the land. Finally, Mediterranean agriculture depends on government subsidies and has little to do with environmental or market factors. Water shortages, fires and agriculture in Mediterranean Europe are government "services;" they have little to do with ecosystem services.

In the end, if we circumscribe the question to Europe, I am left worried only about the effects of climate change on wild nature. Given European institutions, those of us who love nature stand to loose from rapid climate change. To preserve wild habitats and species in a rapidly changing Europe we need rapid responses. We need flexibility. Static nature reserves will not help. Huge public works that act as huge and irreversible ecological barriers will not help. Kafkaesque bureaucracy will not help.

Red Lists and extinction analyses

Science has published the following letter ("Problems of studying extinction risks") by A. H. Harcourt (Department of Anthropology, University of California):

M. Cardillo et al.'s analysis of mammalian extinction biology uses data from the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species [here and below I have replaced the original citations with links]. I believe that conservationists should be much more circumspect than we currently are about conclusions based on such analyses of the Red List.

The Red List is not managed as a database for biological analysis. Many problems are inherent in using threatened species lists for purposes for which they were not designed (Possingham et al., available here). The Red List's categorizations are largely informed guesswork by experts. That guesswork is vital and appropriate, given how little we know of most of the world's species and how little would be done about them if we insisted on full knowledge before action. Nevertheless, what is going to inform guesswork but knowledge of extinction biology?

Consequently, the biology of extinction is being investigated by the use of data that are (properly) fundamentally affected by knowledge of extinction biology. I cannot see that the inevitable circularity is removed by use of, for example, only species categorized on the basis of only population size or rate of decline (Purvis et al., free access; Cardillo et al.): The expert does not know the rate of decline (Blake and Hedges) but does know that large-bodied, slow-reproducing species that live in small geographic ranges are more likely to be threatened than are small-bodied, fast species in large ranges--and so suggests a faster decline for the former.

How can use of Red Lists to investigate extinction biology avoid such circularity, especially when the IUCN does not yet have the resources to make available the data on which the categorizations are based?

Cardillo et al. reply:

Despite Harcourt's concerns about circularity, biological traits do not form part of the process of categorizing species under criterion A. Categorizations of extinction risk are made under explicit, objective, and quantitative criteria (Rodrigues et al.). For example, under criterion A1, a species is listed as Vulnerable, Endangered, or Critically Endangered if the rate of population decline has been 50 to 70%, 70 to 90%, or >90%, respectively, over a period of 10 years or three generations, whichever is longer (IUCN). Rates of decline may be assessed from direct observations or inferred from indirect evidence such as catch statistics or habitat loss. If the latter, there are explicit guidelines for inferring population decline rates from indirect evidence (IUCN), and assessors must present the evidence they have used to conclude that a population has declined by the amount claimed. Before listing, assessments are reviewed by independent Red List Authorities. Species listings are accompanied by a justification giving support for the listing, together with relevant data and references, thus making the process as repeatable and transparent as possible. Species for which too little data exist to assign to an extinction risk category are listed as Data Deficient.

Although listing procedures are probably not as rigorous as Cardillo et al. portray them, it is still possible that the Red List data are good enough to learn something from Cardillo et al.'s analysis. But I agree with Harcourt that there remains a suspicion of circularity, and that the same applies to similar studies. Threatened status is no surrogate for extinction, and researchers consciously or unconsciously draw on their ideas about extinction when they make risk estimates for individual species.

Science, advocacy and greenhouse gases

A recent paper reviews "the growing evidence that climate-health relationships pose increasing health risks under future projections of climate change and that the warming trend over recent decades has already contributed to increased morbidity and mortality in many regions of the world" (Jonathan A. Patz, Diarmid Campbell-Lendrum, Tracey Holloway and Jonathan A. Foley, Impact of regional climate change on human health, Nature, free access). It doesn't review -- actually it doesn't even mention -- any positive health effects of climate warming. It doesn't review or mention any costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But it concludes:

[T]he regions with the greatest burden of climate-sensitive diseases are also the regions with the lowest capacity to adapt to the new risks. Africa -- the continent where an estimated 90% of malaria occurs -- has some of the lowest per capita emissions of the greenhouse gases that cause global warming. In this sense, global climate change not only presents new region-specific health risks, but also a global ethical challenge. To meet this challenge, precautionary approaches to mitigating anthropogenic greenhouse gases will be necessary [...].

Another recent paper follows the same logic (Gian-Reto Walther, Lesley Hughes, Peter Vitousek and Nils Chr. Stenseth, Consensus on climate change, published in Trends in Ecology and Evolution, subscription required).

[C]limate change is already affecting the behavior and distribution of species and the composition and structure of communities and ecosystems [...].

The authors then call "for a substantial and long-term reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions." They fail to consider the potential costs of this policy. As a result, they fail to convince me. So what, I'm not a politician or policy maker.

Scientists need to get more closely involved in opinion-forming to influence more effectively future climate change decisions made by politicians and policy makers.

Effects of invasive species

Invasive species can increase fire frequency, decrease fire frequency, deplete underground water, clog waterways, displace native species, or just make landscapes uglier for us humans. Because they are damaging the environment, people argue for their elimination. But...

Removing invasives is more a human preference than a scientifically grounded prerogative, argues Mark Davis, an ecologist at Macalester College in St Paul, Minnesota. "There is a huge amount of arbitrariness here," he says. "Can't we just forget about where they came from, identify species that are causing us problems according to our values, and then deal with them?" (From Nature.)

I, for one, can't forget. I like places to be distinct. I enjoy visiting distant places because they look so different from home, and because they reflect so different histories. Invasive species are ruining the distinctiveness of places. I dislike invasive species and, yes, this is an arbitrary preference.

The fact that invasive species are causing problems other than erasing the marks of history and eroding the diversity of landscapes is a wholly different matter. In this regard, Mark Davis is right that invasive and native species deserve the same treatment.

Do invasive species cause more such problems than native species? Well, that is the question. We don't know the answer because it just doesn't cross the minds of ecologists to argue that a "native" species living in its "natural" environment is doing harm because it increases fire frequency, decreases fire frequency, depletes underground water, clogs waterways, decreases water quality, or displaces other native species. We avoid applying this kind of utilitarian analysis to natural ecosystems. We do apply utilitarian analyses to native species and ecosystems, but biased ones that systematically ignore their negative effects.

Care that kills

Tyler Cowen writes in Marginal Revolution:

If libertarians thought too much about death, they would have to admit that it is the greatest loss of liberty possible (even worse than taxes), which might lead to government intervention.

... were it not for the likeliness that governments kill more people than they save.

Steady state economy

Proponents of the steady state economy, like Herman Daly, Brian Czech and the North American Section of the Society for Conservation Biology, believe that:

1- There is an absolute physical and ecological limit to economic growth.
2- We are rapidly approaching that limit.
3- We must stop economic growth before we reach that limit. Otherwise, human well-being will fall precipitously.
4- Rich nations should establish the steady state economy right now, while the poorer nations should, for humanitarian reasons, increase their wealth for the time being.

A post by Will Wilkinson has some bearing on proposition 4:

As the world grows increasingly globally interconnected, you have to squarely face the fact that slowing growth in the big economies really, really hurts poor people elsewhere. This is not dogma. It's what you might call "reality based," or the truth. And that's one of the main reasons I find it despicable when comfortable western intellectuals argume to the effect that England, say, ought to impose policies meant to get their citizens to work less and enjoy more leisure time, since the added wealth created by their economic production isn't doing THEM as much good as longer vacations would. But policies that effect the productivity of the English economy don't just effect the English. Lower growth in England means more hungry, sick and dying babies in China. That's why growth-slowing "quality of life" reforms in advanced economies can be construed as "progressive" only relative to a repugnant nationalist, anti-cosmopolitan standard.

In case anyone is worried, I also note that the empirical support for proposition 2 is very weak.

Conservation refugees

Mark Dowie calls them "conservation refugees" and says (in Orion, found via The Uneasy Chair) there are millions all around the world. Governments have forcibly displaced them from their lands in order to establish nature reserves. "Conservation refugees" are victims of government abuse of property.

Dowie quotes Peter Seligman, CEO of Conservation International, as saying that "indigenous people must have ownership, control and title of their lands." That's the way to go (except that I think the word "indigenous" is superfluous, if not discriminatory -- everybody, regardless of race, ancestry or place of birth, should have the same rights). If someone (say, the Wildlife Conservation Society) wants to exclude people from a piece of wildland, then let it negotiate a price with the legitimate owners of the land. If they strike a deal both parties will be better off than before.

Lack of adequate property rights, including the right to voluntary sell the land, is not only detrimental to the people living in wildlands but also detrimental to conservation. People interested in conserving wildlands cannot buy lands that do not have rightful owners. Instead they have to rely on lobbying the governments that have the ultimate authority over those lands. In the end, governments assign some public lands to nature conservation, others to mining or timber extraction or whatever. Governments' decissions on these matters -- which and how much land goes to each use -- are rather arbitrary.